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REMOVING BUNDERS FROM THE 
JUDICIARY: IN RE ARTI', BRENNAN, KIRBY AS 
AN EVOLUTIONARY STEP IN THE UNITED 
STATES-UNITED KINGDOM EXTRADITION 
SCHEME 
Abstract: Within the extradition treaty between the United States and the 
United Kingdom, there exists an exemption for fugitives who have allegedly 
committed crimes that are political in nautre. The political offense exemp-
tion has resulted in complications when dealing with the thorny issue of al-
leged terrorists from Northern Ireland who flee to the United States. This 
Note traces the history of the political offense exemption and scrutinizes the 
results of a recent Ninth Circuit decision, In re Artt, Brennan, Kirby, in 
which the court concluded that federal courts may inquire into systemic bias 
when considering whether or not a defendant'S conviction in the Northern 
Ireland judicial system was tainted by prejudice. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the field of extradition law, there is perhaps no issue more 
complex or controversial than terrorism. l The treatment of suspected 
or convicted terrorists by the United States in extradition proceedings 
entails a delicate balance between two competing motivations: on the 
one hand lies a desire to ensure that perpetrators of violence are duly 
punished for their unlawful acts; on the other is the historical notion 
that the United States should protect those who are unjustly perse-
cuted in their native lands.2 Under most extradition treaties, this bal-
ance is achieved by an exemption for fugitives who have allegedly 
committed crimes that are political in nature.3 
1 See GEOFF GILBERT, AsPECTS OF EXTRADITION LAw 132 (1991). 
2 See generally Supplementary Treaty Concerning the Extradition Treaty Between the 
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, June 25, 1985, T.I.A.S. No. 12050 [hereinafter 
Supplementary Treaty], reprinted in S. REp. No. 99-17 at 15-17 (1986) [hereinafter Senate 
Report]; Extradition Treaty Between the Gqvernment of the United States of America and 
the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Oct. 21, 
1976, U.S.-UK, 28 U.S.T. 227, T.I.A.S. No. 8468 [hereinafter 1977 Treaty]. 
3 See 1977 Treaty, supra note 2, art. V(I) (c) (i); Senate Report, supra note 2, at 1. 
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The political offense exemption has proven to be inadequate, 
however, when dealing with the thorny issue of alleged terrorists from 
Northern Ireland who flee to the United States.4 Northern Ireland is 
a region beset by political violence where the legal system operates in 
a secretive and often draconian manner.5 In recent years, the U.S. leg-
islature and judiciary have attempted to grapple with the difficulties 
inherent in determining whether fugitives from Northern Ireland 
should be returned to the United Kingdom once apprehended, or 
allowed to remain in the United States, sheltered from persecution.6 
In 1986, the Senate ratified a treaty that provides a defense to extradi-
tion for those fugitives who can demonstrate that their convictions 
were unlawfully tainted by prejudice, or that they will suffer unjust, 
prejudicial punishment if returned to the United Kingdom.7 
Judicial interpretation of this treaty has centered largely on 
whether federal courts are empowered to hear a defendant's evidence 
of generalized, systemic bias within the Northern Ireland system of 
justice.8 The most recent case to consider this issue was the 1998 
Ninth Circuit decision In re Artt, Brennan, Kirby.9 In that case, the 
court concluded that federal courts may inquire into systemic bias 
when considering whether or not a defendant's conviction was tainted 
by prejudice. to 
Part I of this Note provides a brief historical overview of the po-
litical and religious strife in Northern Ireland and then looks more 
extensively at the system of justice that has been established there 
over the past thirty years. Part II examines the United States-United 
Kingdom extradition scheme and considers the proper scope of judi-
cial inquiry into foreign legal systems. Part III discusses the three 
cases in which federal courts have considered whether to hear a fugi-
tive's claims of general, inherent bias in the English and Northern 
Irish systems of justice. Part IV analyzes the Ninth Circuit's reasoning 
4 See, e.g., Supplementary Treaty, supra note 2; In re Requested Extradition of Doherty, 
599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y 1984). 
5 See generally Northern Ireland Emergency Provisions Act, ch. 5 (1978) [hereinafter 
EPA]. 
6 See, e.g., Supplementary Treaty, supra note 2; In re Requested Extradition of Artt, 
Brennan, Kirby, 158 F.3d 462 (9th Cir. 1998), reh'ggranted, 183 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 1999); In 
re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 61 F.3d 711 (9th Cir. 1995), rell'g, 863 F. Supp. 1137 
(N.D. Cal. 1994). 
7 See Supplementary Treaty. supra note 2, art. 3(a). 
8 See generally In re Artt, Brennan, Kirby, 158 F.3d 462; In re Smyth, 61 F.3d 711. 
9158 F.3d 462. 
10 See id. at 475. 
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in the most recent of these decisions, In re Artt, Brennan, Kirby. Finally, 
this Note concludes that for moral, prudential, and legal reasons, 
other federal circuits should follow the Ninth Circuit's example and 
permit broad judicial inquiry into systemic bias when a fugitive's con-
viction may have been tainted by prejudice. To prevent fugitives from 
abusing this defense and bogging down extradition proceedings, 
judges should utilize an individually tailored prima Jacie threshold for 
presentation of evidence of systemic bias. 
1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CURRENT LEGAL SYSTEM IN 
NORTHERN IRELAND 
A. Overview oj Political and Religious Turmoil 
Northern Ireland's history of internal strife and political and re-
ligious polarization extends as far back as the first English invasion of 
Ireland in 1170.11 Almost every generation since that time has seen 
incidents of armed insurrection against British rule by those who 
would preserve the sovereignty and integrity of a united Ireland.12 Ire-
land's current geopolitical landscape originated under the United 
Kingdom's 1920 Government of Ireland Act, which established a par-
liament in Belfast to govern the six northeastern counties of Ireland 
(Northern Ireland) and a separate parliament in Dublin to govern 
the other twenty-six.13 In 1921, these lower twenty-six counties became 
the Irish Free State, while Northern Ireland remained part of the Brit-
ish empire.14 
This partition of the island did little to placate either national-
ists-a largely Catholic group which seeks a unified Ireland-or un-
ionists, a predominantly Protestant group which insists upon North-
ern Ireland's allegiance with the rest of the United Kingdom. 15 The 
nationalist and unionist groups both have subsets-republicans and 
loyalists, respectively-which advocate the use of violence as a legiti-
mate means of pursuing their political goals. 16 The Irish Republican 
Army (IRA) and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) are 
\1 See BRIAN BARTON, A POCKET HISTORY OF ULSTER 11 (1996). 
12 See id. 
13 See id. at 27. 
14 See id. at 36. 
15 Seeln reRequested Extradition of Smyth, 863 F. Supp. 1137, 1139-40 (N.D. Cal. 
1994), rev1161 F.3d 711 (9th Cir. 1995). 
16 See id. 
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two of the most prominent republican paramilitary groupsP The 
counterpart loyalist organizations are the Ulster Freedom Fighters 
and the Ulster Volunteer Force.I8 Since 1969, over 3,000 people have 
been killed in the political violence, and over 35,000 have been in-
jured.19 
The upsurge of violence over the past thirty years was sparked by 
the growth of the Catholic civil rights movement in the late 1960s.2o 
Catholics took to the streets at this time to protest what they perceived 
as discrimination by the mostly Protestant government in Northern 
Ireland.21 Their marches evoked a violent response, both from the 
Royal Ulster Constabulary-the Northern Ireland police force-and 
from Protestants whose counter-marches devolved into riots against 
Catholics.22 In an attempt to restore order, the British deployed troops 
into Northern Ireland in 1969.23 
Guerilla violence has persisted since that time, marked most re-
cently by the horrific 1998 bombing in Omagh, Northern Ireland, 
that killed 28 innocent civilians and injured 220.24 The bombing was 
committed by the "Real IRA," a radical splinter group of the IRA.25 
The attack was a tragic counterpoint to the landmark "Good Friday 
Peace Accord," formed on April 10, 1998.26 The peace accord main-
tains Northern Ireland's status as a British province for as long as the 
majority of the province wants it to remain so.27 The accord further 
stipulated that Britain eventually turn over control of the area to a 
new provincial government, the Northern Ireland Assembly, in which 
Catholics and Protestants will participate side-by-side.28 The peace ac-
17 See id. at 1140; see also PAUL ARTHUR & KEITH JEFFERY, NORTHERN IRELAND SINCE 
1968,37 (1988) (describing how the militant PIRA emerged in the late 1960s after disillu-
sionment with the stagnant Official IRA). 
18 See In re Smyth, 863 F. Supp. at 1140. 
19 See id. 
20 See CAROLINE KENNEDy-PIPE, THE ORIGINS OF THE PRESENT TROUBLES IN NORTHERN 
IRELAND 41-42 (1997). 
21 See id. 
22 See id. at 46. 
23 See id. at 48. 
24 See 'Real IRA' Accepts Blamefor Bombing, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 19, 1998, atA3. 
25 See id. 
26 See Bill Glauber, Peace Comes toN. Ireland, BALTIMORE SUN, Apr. 11, 1998, at lA. 
27 See Marjorie Miller, Victory Ushers in Era of Hope for Northern Ireland Vote, LA. TIMES, 
May 24, 1998, at AI. 
28 See id. This transition occurred at midnight on December 1, 1999, thus fulfilling one 
of the most important provisions of the Good Friday agreement. See Ray Moseley, New Era 
for Nothern Ireland, CHI. TRtB., Dec. 3, 1999, at AI; Fawn Vrazo, Northern Ireland Gains Self-
Rule, Hous. CHRONICLE, Dec. 2, 1999, at 29. 
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cord was endorsed by 71 % of Northern Irish voters in a May 1998 ref-
erendum.29 
B. The Diplock Report 
The recent history of anti-terrorist legislation in Northern Ire-
land took shape in the wake of civil rights protests in the late 1960s.30 
In response to the violence that persisted despite the presence of Brit-
ish army troops, the British government instituted direct rule over 
Northern Ireland's affairs in 1972.31 One of the government's first 
tasks was to re-evaluate procedures for dealing with terrorists and sus-
pected perpetrators of violence.32 Before 1972, the government of 
Northern Ireland had relied on internment-the detention of terror-
ist suspects without trial-to stem the tide of violence.33 This method 
proved ineffective, as internment merely hardened the resolve of 
many terrorists and fueled the fires of political violence.34 In October 
of 1972, the British government established a commission to recom-
mend more effective and perhaps humane ways of dealing with ter-
rorism. 35 Two months later, the commission issued the "Diplock Re-
port," which outlined legal procedures to deal with the emergency 
situation in Northern Ireland.36 
The most notable provision of the Diplock Report calls for the 
creation of specialized criminal courts (Diplock Courts) in which sus-
pected terrorists are tried without right to a jury. 37 Traditionally, citizens 
of Northern Ireland had been accorded the right of trial before a jury 
of twelve peers, selected at random from the community.38 The Dip-
lock Commission felt that this system was unworkable in the context 
of political violence in Northern Ireland, where there existed a real 
29 See Ray Moseley, New Era for Nothern Ireland, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 3, 1999, at AI; Fawn 
Vrazo, Northern Ireland Gains Self-Rule, Hous. CHRONICLE, Dec. 2, 1999, at 29. 
30 See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text. 
31 See JOHN JACKSON & SEAN DORAN, JUDGE WITHOUT JURY: DIPLOCK TRIALS IN THE 
ADVERSARY SYSTEM 8 (1995). 
32 See id. 
33 See REpORT OF THE COMMISSION TO CONSIDER LEGAL PROCEDURES TO DEAL WITH 
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1972, Cmnd. 5185, at 1 (Lord Diplock, 
Chairman) [hereinafter Diplock Report);JACKSON & DORAN, supra note 31, at 8. 
34 SeeJACKSON & DORAN, supra note 31, at 8. 
35 See Diplock Report, supra note 33, at 1 ;jACKSON & DORAN, supra note 31, at 8. 
36 See Diplock Report, supra note 33, at 3. The commission, report, and certain ele-
ments therein have taken on the name of the commission's chainnan, Lord Diplock. 
37 See Diplock Report, supra note 33, at 18. 
38 See id. at 17. 
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threat of witness and juror intimidation by terrorist groupS.39 Fur-
thermore, the Commission emphasized the difficulty of obtaining ju-
rors anywhere in Northern Ireland who were not biased by political 
sympathies.40 This problem was particularly grave, considering the 
geographic concentrations of republicans and loyalists in specific ar-
eas of the country, and the consequent problem of obtaining a diverse 
jury pool in those areas.41 The Diplock Report concluded that: 
matters have now reached a stage in Northern Ireland at 
which it would not be safe to continue to rely upon methods 
hitherto used for securing impartial trial by a jury of terrorist 
crimes . . .. [T] rial by judge alone should take the place of 
trial by jury for the duration of the emergency.42 
Criticism of the Diplock Report emerged during parliamentary 
debates over the 1973 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) 
Act.43 Critics expressed reservations regarding the evidence Lord Dip-
lock used to derive his conclusions about jury bias and intimidation.44 
Furthermore, many felt that the Diplock Report did nothing to im-
prove upon the former system of internment, a practice that "struck 
at the very root of public conceptions of justice according to law. "45 
C. The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 
The recommendations of the Diplock Commission were "incor-
porated wholesale" into the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) 
Act (EPA), passed in 1973 and renewed and expanded in 1978.46 The 
EPA is still in force in Northern Ireland.47 The EPA severely curtails 
civil liberties of persons living in Northern Ireland, and makes par-
ticular provision for those suspected of terrorist activities (as defined 
in the list of "scheduled offenses") .48 The EPA contains provisions for 
39 See id. 
40 See id. 
41 See id. 
42 Diplock Report, supra note 33, at 18. 
43 SeejAcKsoN & DORAN, supra note 31, at 17. 
44 See id. 
45 Id. at 18 (citations omitted). 
46 See In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 61 F.3d 711, 713-14 (citations omitted). 
47 See In re Requested Extradition of Artt, Brennan, Kirby, 158 F.3d 462, 464 (9th Cir. 
1998), reh'ggranted, 183 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 1999); In reSrnyth, 61 F.3d at 714. 
48 See EPA, supra note 5, at app. sched. 4; Kelly D. Talcott, Questions of Justice: U.S. 
Courts' Powers of Inquiry Under Artick 3(a) of the United States-United Kingdom Supplementary 
Extradition Treaty, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 474, 478-84 (1987). The EPA's scheduled of-
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pre-trial arrest and detention and for procedures during tria1.49 Prior 
to trial, the EPA grants police enormous power to investigate terrorist 
crimes and pursue suspects.50 Notable provisions include: 
• Any constable may arrest without warrant any person he suspects 
of being a terrorist, and may enter and search that person's 
premises or any other premises without warrant.51 The suspected 
terrorist may be detained for up to seventy-two hours,52 during 
which time he is usually interrogated.53 Abuses by police during 
this interrogation period have been documented. 54 
• Any constable or British soldier may stop and question any per-
son to ascertain that person's identity, or to determine what he 
knows concerning terrorist activity, and if that person refuses to 
answer he may be imprisoned or fined. 55 
• "Young persons" (ages 14-17) accused of scheduled offenses may 
be imprisoned while awaiting tria1.56 
• Any person belonging to a "proscribed organisation" (including 
the IRA), and any person dressing or behaving like a member of 
such an organization, is subject to prison, a fine, or both.57 
• Any person who wears a hood, mask, or other item designed to 
conceal identity while out of doors is subject to prison, a fine, or 
both.58 
Mter arrest, the EPA authorizes other notable reductions of civil 
liberties: 
fenses include a wide variety of crimes against persons or property, not all of which are 
necessarily politically motivated. See Talcott, snjJra at 481-82. However, the Attorney Gen-
eral for Northern Ireland may certity a crime as "nonscheduled" (and thus not subject to 
the provisions of the EPA) if the government believes it has no connection with terrorism. 
See id. at 482. Thus, those accused of politically motivated crimes are subject to an entirely 
different criminal justice system from the rest of the populace. See id. 
49 See generally EPA, supra note 5. 
50 See id. 
5! See id. §§ 11, 13. 
52 See id. § 11 (3). 
53 See Talcott, supra note 48, at 479 n.29. 
54 See id. at 48l. 
55 See EPA, snjml note 5, § 18. 
56 See id. § 4. 
57 See id. §§ 21, 25 (emphasis added). 
58 See id. § 26. 
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• In cases of scheduled offenses, the EPA significantly limits the 
power of judges to grant bail prior to the adjournment of triaJ.59 
That power is left solely in the hands of the Supreme Court.60 
• Evidentiary standards are significantly reduced, allowing any con-
fession to be entered into evidence, whether voluntary or not, 
provided it was not induced by torture or inhumane treatment.61 
This standard is a loose one and tacitly condones the use of some 
degree of physical violence to obtain confessions.62 
• A trial on indictment of a scheduled offense shall be conducted 
by a court without ajury.63 
With its strict and forceful measures to combat terrorism, the 
EPA has enabled courts in Northern Ireland to drastically impinge 
upon the procedural safeguards that traditionally guarantee a "fair 
trial" in most common law jurisdictions.64 While the EPA technically 
applies to all citizens, some have asserted that in practice, the EPA has 
been used chiefly to curtail the personal liberties of Catholics only.65 
II. THE UNITED STATES-UNITED KINGDOM EXTRADITION SCHEME 
A. The 1977 Extradition Treaty 
The 1977 Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of the United King-
dom of Britain and Northern Ireland (1977 Treaty) primarily governs 
the United States-United Kingdom extradition scheme.66 As a general 
rule, the 1977 Treaty provides that "[e]xtradition shall be granted for 
... an offense within any of the descriptions listed in the Schedule 
annexed to this Treaty ... or any other offense .... "67 However, the 
1977 Treaty also contains exceptions under which extradition will not 
occur.68 For example, the "double criminality" requirement (a stan-
59 See id. § 2. 
60 See EPA, supra note 5, § 2. 
61 See id. § 8. 
62 See Talcott, supra note 48, at 483. 
63 See EPA, supra note 5, § 7; see also discussion of "Diplock Courts," supra notes 37-42 
and accompanying text. 
64 See In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 61 F.3d 711, 714 (9th Cir. 1995). 
65 See Daniel T. Kiely, Jr. , Note, The Compromise Between Outrage and Compassion: Article 
3(a) and In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 30 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 587, 599 (1997). 
66 See 1977 Treaty, supra note 2. 
671d. art. III(l). 
68 See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text. 
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dard provlSlon in the law of extradition)69 prevents extradition for 
crimes that are not "punishable under the laws of both Parties by im-
prisonment or other form of detention for more than one year or by 
the death penalty .... "70 
Furthermore, Article V of the 1977 Treaty provides that 
"[e]xtradition shall not be granted if ... the offense for which extra-
dition is requested is regarded by the requested Party as one of a po-
litical character .... "71 Most extradition treaties contain similar politi-. 
cal offense exceptions,72 and the Article V provision is a "typical 
formulation. "73 The political offense exception derives from the no-
tion that political dissent is an important mechanism for social 
change, and dissidents should be shielded from retaliation by a hos-
tile home government.74 However, there is no universally agreed-upon 
definition of what constitutes a political ofIense.75 
B. Emerging Consternation with Article V of the 1977 Treaty 
The political offense exception to the 1977 Treaty soon became 
entangled in the issue of terrorism in Northern Ireland.76 One of the 
greatest controversies in extradition law revolves around whether ter-
rorist acts are political in nature-and thus protectable under the po-
litical offense exception-or whether they are simply inexcusable 
criminal behavior.77 As one scholar has noted, 
One person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter in 
fear of persecution .... Terrorism is not a legal concept that 
can be examined in such a way that it is possible to define 
those instances when it is within and those when it is outside 
the political offense exemption. It is truly a "hot issue. "78 
Beginning in 1979, a series of United States decisions denied ex-
tradition of IRA members because their acts, while criminal, were 
69 See GILBERT, supra note 1, at 52. 
70 1977 Treaty, sUjnanote 2, art. III(I)(a). 
71 Id. art. V(I) (c)(i). 
72 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 476(2) (1986). 
73 In re Requested Extradition of Artt, Brennan, Kirby, 158 F.3d 462, 465 (9th Cir. 
1998), reh'ggranted, 183 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 1999). 
74 See Kiely, supra note 65, at 605. 
75 See "Extradition-Political Offences, "ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
331 (1992). 
76 See In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 61 F.3d 711, 714 (9th Cir. 1995). 
77 See GILBERT, supra note 1, at 132-33. 
78 Id. at 133. 
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considered political in nature.79 In In re McMullen, a case that involved 
an IRA terrorist who had bombed British army barracks and fled to 
the United States, the district court ruled that the Article V political 
offense exception prohibits extradition when the criminal act occurs 
as part of a political uprising and when the accused is a person en-
gaged in acts of political violence with a political end.80 Notably, the 
court stated that "[e]ven though the offense be deplorable and hei-
nous, the criminal actor will be excluded from deportation if the 
crime is committed under these pre-requisites. "81 Mter reviewing evi-
dence which established that the defendant was a member of the IRA 
and that the IRA was a group seeking a political objective, the court 
concluded that the bombing was of a political nature, and thus the 
defendant could not be extradited.82 
In the 1981 case In re Mackin, the United Kingdom sought the 
defendant's extradition to face charges of attempted murder of a Brit-
ish soldier in Belfast.83 The Second Circuit refused to issue a writ of 
mandamus to reverse a magistrate who had held that "the offenses 
committed against the British soldier were incidental to Mackin's role 
in the PlRA's political uprising in Belfast," and that therefore the de-
fendant could not be extradited for those offenses.84 In In re Doherty in 
1984, the Southern District of New York denied the request for extra-
dition of a PlRA member who was convicted of murdering a British 
army captain.85 The court determined that because the murder had 
occurred during a pre-meditated ambush of the captain's patrol unit, 
the crime typified "the political offense exception in its most classic 
fonn."86 
The outcomes of these cases infuriated the British Government 
and led to calls for reformation of the 1977 Treaty.87 Fearing that con-
tinued decisions such as these would turn the United States into a ha-
ven for terrorists, the Reagan Administration proposed a new treaty 
that would have eliminated judicial application of the political offense 
79 See In Fe Smyth. 61 F.3d at 714. 
80 See In reExtradition of McMullen, Mag. No. 3-70-1099 M.G. (N.D. Cal. May 11, 
1979), reprinted in 132 CONGo REc. 16,585-86 (1986). 
81Id. 
82 See id. at 16,586. 
83 Seeln re Requested Extradition of Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 124-25 (2d Cir. 1981). 
84 Id. at 125. 
85 See In re Requested Extradition of Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270, 277 (S.D.N.Y 1984). 
86 Id. at 276. 
87 See In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 61 F.3d 711, 714 (9th Cir. 1995). 
2000] U.S.-u.K. Extradition 273 
exception.88 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, however, 
sought to forge a compromise between the general distaste for use of 
the political offense exception as a shield for terrorists, and the tradi-
tion in the United States of providing refuge for political dissidents.89 
In 1985 this compromise became manifested in the Supplementary 
Treaty Concerning the Extradition Treaty Between the Government 
of the United States of America and the Government of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Signed at London 
on 8 June 1972 (Supplementary Treaty) .90 
C. The Supplementary Treaty 
The Supplementary Treaty limits the impact of Article V of the 
1977 Treaty by creating new standards for application of the political 
offense exception and by restricting the definition of what constitutes 
a political offense.91 Article 1 of the Supplementary Treaty lists certain 
offenses that are deemed not political in nature, notably "murder, 
voluntary manslaughter, and assault causing grievous bodily harm; 
kidnapping, abduction, or serious unlawful detention, including tak-
ing a hostage; an offense involving the use of a bomb, grenade, 
rocket, firearm, letter or parcel bomb, or any incendiary device if this 
use endangers any person .... ''92 Such broad restrictions on what 
constitutes a political offense dramatically curtail use of Article V of 
the 1977 Treaty as a defense to extradition.93 Article 1 of the Supple-
mentary Treaty reverses the McMullen, Mackin, and Doherty trend of 
denying extradition for IRA and PIRA terrorists who commit heinous 
crimes and flee to the United States.94 Such a reversal was one of the 
primary goals of the Supplementary Treaty.95 
The restrictions of Article 1, however, are counterbalanced by the 
terms of Article 3 (a), which provide two scenarios under which the 
political offense exception will be allowed as a defense to extradition.96 
The first clause of Article 3(a), known as the Aquino clause,97 states: 
88 See id. 
89 See 132 CONGo REc. 16,586 (1986) (comments of Sen. Lugar). 
90 Supplementary Treaty, supra note 2. 
91 See id. arts. I, 3. 
92 Id. arts. l(b),(c),(d). 
93 See id. art. 1; 1977 Treaty, supra note 2, art. V. 
94 See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text (discussing these cases). 
95 Seel32 CONGo REc. 16,586 (1986) (comments of Sen. Lugar). 
96 See Supplementary Treaty, supra note 2, art. 3(a). 
97 See Leslie A. Firtell, Note, The Evidentiary Burden in Establishing an Article 3( a) Defense 
to Extradition in Light of In re the Requested Extradition of James Joseph Smyth, a Case of 
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Nothwithstanding [sic] any other provision of this Supple-
mentary Treaty, extraditon [sic] shall not occur if the person 
sought establishes to the satisfaction of the competent judi-
cial authority by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
request for extradition has in fact been made with a view to 
try or punish him on account of his race, religion, national-
ity, or political opinions .... 98 
The Aquino clause seeks to ensure that a request for extradition is not 
based on "trumped-up" charges designed to punish the defendant for 
his or her identity or ideology.99 The second ("future treatment")100 
clause of Article 3(a) prohibits extradition if the person sought estab-
lishes that "he would, if surrendered, be prejudiced at his trail [sic] or 
punished, detained, or restricted in his personal liberty by reason of 
his race, religion, nationality, or political opinions."lOl 
D. The Scope of judicial Inquiry Under Article 3( a) 
Under traditional U.S. extradition law, the courts maintain a 
general policy of "noninquiry. "102 Under that policy, the extraditing 
court will not inquire into the judicial system of the requesting coun-
try nor the treatment that will await the fugitive there.103 Such matters 
are considered best left to the judgment of the State Department, 
reflecting the view that the courts generally lack both the expertise 
and the proper diplomatic posture to evaluate a foreign nation's legal 
system. 104 
Article 3(a) defies the traditional rule of noninquiry, authorizing 
the courts to investigate the foreign judicial system to ascertain 
whether the extraditee might be denied a fair trial or otherwise be 
prejudiced under that system.I05 Accordingly, the Supplementary 
Treaty engendered a debate over the proper scope of judicial inquiry 
First Impression, 4 CARDOZO]' INT'L & COMPo L. 73, 77 n.25 (1996). This clause was devised 
in response to the Philippine Government's plan to file false charges against Nimoy 
Aquino to secure his extradition from the United States. See id. 
98 Supplementa,'y Treaty, supm note 2, art. 3(a). 
99 See Senate Report, supm note 2, at 4. 
100 In re Requested Extradition of Artt, Brennan, Kirby, 158 F.3d 462, 473 (9th Cir. 
1998), reh 'g granted, 183 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 1999). 
'101 Supplementary Treaty, supra note 2, art. 3 (a). 
102 See In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 61 F.3d 7II, 714 (9th Cir. 1995). 
103 See id. 
104 See id.;Judith Hippler Bello & Valerie Epps, Rule of Expanded Political Offense-Type Ex-
ception, 90 AM.]. INT'L L. 296, 297 (1996). 
105 See Supplementary Treaty, supra note 2, art. 3(a). 
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when the extraditee claims an Article 3(a) defense.106 During con-
gressional debate on the Supplementary Treaty, Senator Thomas Ea-
gleton offered the view that the scope of inquiry should be narrow, 
limited only to analysis of specific factors that might deny the extra-
ditee a fair trial in the foreign judicial system.107 In the case of IRA or 
PlRA fugitives from Northern Ireland, Senator Eagleton would have 
had the court inquire only as to specific aspects of the Diplock Court 
system that might deny the defendant a fair trial, and not into the 
"abstract fairness" of the system of justice as a whole. lOS A much 
broader view was espoused by Senator John Kerry, who felt that Arti-
cle 3(a) authorizes an expansive inquiry into whether the entire for-
eign system of justice is inherently prejudiced against the defendant's 
identity or ideology.I09 In the case of an IRA or PlRA fugitive, the in-
quiry would presumably involve questions of general bias against 
Catholics and/or republicans in the Northern Ireland justice sys-
tem.no 
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 3(A) 
A. In re Howard 
There have been only three instances in which fugitives have util-
ized an Article 3(a) defense before U.S. courts.lll The first such in-
stance was In re Howard, a case in which the United Kingdom sought 
the extradition of an American black male to face charges of brutally 
murdering a young white female in England.JI2 Howard did not con-
test the existence of probable cause to believe he was the murderer, 
but instead argued that he would not get a fair trial in the United 
Kingdom owing to his race and nationality, and therefore he should 
be shielded from extradition under Article 3(a).J13 To support his de-
fense, Howard presented evidence which tended to demonstrate that 
a British jury would likely be prejudiced against a black man accused 
106 See Kiely, supra note 65, at 612-13. 
107 See 132 CONGo REc. 16,607 (1986) (remarks of Sen. Eagleton). 
108 See id. 
109 See 132 CONGo REc. 16,800 (1986) (remarks of Sen. Ken'y). 
110 See id. 
111 See In re Requested ExtJ'adition of Ant, Brennan, Kirby, 158 F.3d 462 (9th Cir. 
1998), reh'ggranted, 183 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 1999); In reRequested Extl'adition of Smyth, 61 
F.3d 711 (9th Cir. 1995); In l'e Extradition of Howard, 996 F.2d 1320 (lst Cir. 1993). 
112 See In re Howard, 996 F.2d at 1323. 
113 See id. at 1324. 
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of murdering a white woman,l14 He also pointed out that under the 
English legal system, there is no voir dire which might ferret out partial 
jurors.1I5 Despite these arguments, the magistrate judge ruled that 
Howard had not made a valid Article 3(a) defense, and the district 
court affirmed.1I6 
The First Circuit reviewed and affirmed the district court's deci-
sion.l17 In its analysis of the Article 3(a) defense, the court urged that 
the scope of inquiry be limited to "specific problems [of potential 
prejudice] encountered by specific respondents, as opposed to gen-
eral grievances concerning systemic weaknesses inherent in every 
case. Otherwise, the extradition treaty actually becomes an impedi-
ment to extradition .... "118 The court went on to conclude that How-
ard had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that he 
would be treated differently by the English justice system because of 
his race, religion, nationality, or political opinions.1I9 The court also 
noted that when the Senate inserted Article 3(a) into the Supplemen-
tary Treaty, it was more concerned with potential unfairness in the 
Diplock system in Northern Ireland than with the legal system of Brit-
ain generally.120 
B. In re Smyth 
The Diplock system itself came under scrutiny in the second case 
involving an Article 3(a) defense, In re Smyth,l21 Defendant Smyth, a 
republican and reputed IRA member,122 was convicted in Northern 
Ireland of the 1978 attempted murder of a prison officer.123 He was 
sentenced to twenty years' incarceration in the Maze Prison,124 but 
escaped along with thirty-eight other republican prisoners during a 
114 See id. 
115 See id. 
116 See id. 
J17 See In re Howard, 996 F.2d at 1333. 
liB Id. at 1330. 
119 See id. at 1332. 
120 See id. at 133l. 
121 See In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 61 F.3d 711, 713-14 (9th Cir. 1995). 
122 See id. at 713. 
123 See id. at 712. 
124 Conditions in Belfast's Maze Prison were "terrible" at this time, and prisoners were 
routinely treated in ways that would be unacceptable in a U.S. prison. See In re Requested 
Extradition of Artt, Brennan, Kirby, 972 F. Supp. 1253, 1270 (N.D. Cal. 1997), rev'd 158 
F.3d 462 (9th Cir. 1998). The Maze Prison was the site of many protests and hunger strikes 
by prisoners. See id. 
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1983 prison break.125 Smyth fled to the United States and lived in the 
San Francisco Bay area until 1992, when he was apprehended by 
United States officials.126 The United Kingdom subsequently sought to 
extradite Smyth to serve out the remainder of his sentence.127 
The district court made extensive findings of fact, delving into 
the current violent political situation in Northern Ireland, and exam-
ining the treatment that both republicans and loyalists receive within 
the Diplock Court system and in the general populace.128 From this 
investigation, the court concluded that as a convicted republican ter-
rorist, Smyth would surely be subject to prejudicial treatment both in 
prison and upon eventual release back into society, should he be ex-
tradited. 129 The court held that the "[a]rrests, detentions and interro-
gations likely to occur because of Smyth's status as a Catholic Irish 
national, a republican, and a Sinn Fein member-rather than because 
he is suspected of committing a crime-are detentions within the 
meaning of [the second clause of] Article 3(a)."130 Relying on this 
broad inquiry into injustice in Northern Ireland, the district court 
accepted Smyth's Article 3(a) defense, and denied the United King-
dom's extradition request.131 
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the lower court erred 
when it relied upon evidence of general discrimination against Catho-
lics and republicans. 132 The court stressed that "Article 3(a) does not 
permit denial of extradition on the basis of an inquiry into the gen-
eral political conditions extant in Northern Ireland."133 Instead, in 
order to mount a successful Article 3(a) defense, Smyth would have 
had to demonstrate that upon his return to Northern Ireland, the 
Diplock system would exact additional punishment beyond the re-
maining term of imprisonment, and that such additional punishment 
would be inflicted because of Smyth's political beliefs, not because of 
his 1978 crime.134 The court stated that because of the narrow scope 
of inquiry permitted by Article 3(a), extraditees indeed have a 
125 See In Te Smyth, 61 F.3d at 713. 
126 See id. 
127 See id. 
128 See In Te Requested Extradition of Smyth, 863 F. Supp. 1137, 1139-48 (N.D. Cal. 
1994), Tev'd61 F.3d 711 (9th Cir. 1995). 
129 See id. at 1155. 
130Id. 
131 See id. 
132 See In Te Smyth, 61 F.3d at 720. 
133Id. 
134 See id. 
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"difficult burden," one which Smyth did not adequately shoulder.135 
Smyth did not demonstrate to the court's satisfaction that upon ex-
tradition, he would be punished by the Diplock system of justice-ei-
ther inside or outside prison walls-on account of his religious or po-
litical beliefs.136 
C. In re Artt, Brennan, Kirby 
The most recent judicial consideration of an Article 3(a) defense 
occurred in In re Artt, Brennan, Kirby.137 The three defendants in that 
case were Catholics from Northern Ireland, convicted of criminal of-
fenses by the Diplock Court system,138 Brennan was sentenced to six-
teen years' imprisonment in 1977 for possession of explosives with 
intent to endanger life or injure property.139 Kirby was given a life sen-
tence in 1978 for felony murder, explosive and gun possession, as-
sault, and false imprisonment.14o Artt was convicted in 1983 of mur-
dering a prison official, and was sentenced to life plus fifteen years' 
imprisonment.141 All three escaped during the 1983 break out of the 
Maze Prison142 and fled to California, where they lived incognito until 
their capture by United States officials in 1992-1994.143 
During the extradition trial in the district court, Brennan first 
attempted to have his case excused as a political offense under Article 
V of the 1977 Treaty.144 He claimed that the mere possession of explo-
sives with intent to injure did not fall within the scope of the Supple-
mentary Treaty,145 The district court, however, rejected this con ten-
tion,146 and consequently all three defendants asserted Article 3(a) 
\35 See id. 
136 See id. at 722. 
137 In re Requested Extradition of Artt, Brennan, Kirby, 158 F.3d 462 (9th Cir. 1998), 
reh 'g granted, 183 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 1999). 
138 See id. at 464. 
139 See id. 
140 See id. 
141 See id. 
142 See In re Requested Extradition of Artt, Brennan, Kirby, 972 F. Supp. 1253, 1259 
(N.D. Cal. 1997), rlm'd 158 F.3d 462 (9th Cir. 1998); In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 
61 F.3d 711, 714 (9th Cir. 1995). 
143 See In re Artt, Brennan, Kirby, 158 F.3d at 464. 
144 See In re Artt, Brennan, Kirby, 972 F. Supp. at 1260. 
145 See Supplementary Treaty, supra note 2, art. 1 (d) (proscribing "an offense involving 
thi! use of a bomb .... ") (emphasis added); In re Artt, Brennan, Kirby, 972 F. Supp. at 1260. 
146 See In re Artt, Brennan, Kirby, 972 F. Supp. at 1262. The judge held that "when one is 
carrying a large bomb, gasoline and detonating paraphernalia to place them in a down-
town city area on a business day, and an arrest is the only thing that stops an explosion 
from occurring, that is an act 'involving' 'the use of a bomb' .... " Id. 
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defenses-namely, that their convictions were "trumped-up" because 
of bias in the Diplock system, or that they would receive prejudicial 
treatment by that system if returned to Northern Ireland.147 In con-
sidering the Article 3(a) claims, the judge looked solely at "the facts of 
each respondent's conviction" and future treatment, and refused to 
make a "generalized inquiry into the Diplock court system. "148 Using 
this narrow scope of inquiry, the district court concluded that none of 
the defendants demonstrated prejudice that had tainted their trials in 
the past, or that would unduly punish them in the future if returned 
to Northern Ireland.149 
In October of 1998, the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court 
with respect to all three defendants, with one judge dissenting,15o The 
court first held that Brennan's crime of possession of explosives was 
indeed outside the scope of the Supplementary Treaty.151 The circuit 
court consequently remanded Brennan's case for determination of 
whether his offense was political in nature and thus exempt from ex-
tradition under Article V of the 1977 Treaty.152 With respect to Artt 
and Kirby, the circuit court held that the lower court erred when it 
used a narrow inquiry to evaluate the defendants' Article 3(a) claims 
of trumped-up convictions. 153 Accordingly, the circuit court remanded 
the cases of Artt and Kirby for reconsideration as well.154 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S REASONING IN IN HE ARTT, 
BRENNAN, KIRBY 
The Ninth Circuit's decision regarding Artt and Kirby is a well-
reasoned and welcome step in the evolution of Article 3(a) doc-
trine,155 In considering Artt and Kirby's Article 3(a) defenses, the 
147 See id. 
148 Id. at 1260. 
149 See id. at 1274-75. "Respondents were convicted because they committed serious 
crimes, not because. they are Catholics or Nationalists or Republicans .... And if returned 
to Northern Ireland, respondents' furthel' punishment will not be because of their beliefs, 
but because of the crimes which they committed." Id. at 1275. 
150 See In re Art!, Brennan, Kirily, 158 F.3d at 475-76. Note: Since the publication of this 
decision, the Ninth Circuit has withdrawn its opinion pending a rehearing to consider 
some of the very issues discussed in Part IV of this Note. See In re Artt, Brennan, Kirby, 183 
F.3d at 944-45. 
151 See In re Artt, Brennan, Kirily, 158 F.3d at 472. 
152 See id. 
153 See id. at 474. 
154 See id. at 475-76. 
155 As the court's decision regarding Brennan involved simple u'eaty interpretation, 
discussion of that aspect of the case is beyond the scope of this Note. 
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court looked separately at claims made pursuant to the Aquino clause 
and those made pursuant to the future treatment clause.l56 This bi-
furcated analysis of Article 3(a) enabled the court to offer a more 
refined vision of the proper extent of judicial inquiry into Northern 
Ireland's justice system.I57 
The court first addressed Artt and Kirby's claims that they would 
suffer discriminatory punishment in the future if returned to prison 
in Northern Ireland. I58 Confirming its earlier ruling in Smyth, the 
court utilized a narrow scope of inquiry into claims under the future 
treatment clause. I59 The court looked specifically at the treatment that 
Artt and Kirby were likely to receive both in prison and once released 
into society, and upheld the lower court's finding that such treatment 
would not entail discriminatory punishment. I6o 
The court arrived at a wholly different conclusion with respect to 
Artt and Kirby's Aquino clause defense.l6I Both defendants claimed 
that their convictions in Northern Ireland were based on false confes-
sions obtained by coercion, and that they never would have been con-
victed were it not for inherent anti-Catholic and anti-republican bias 
in the Diplock justice system.l62 They urged that the United King-
dom's request for extradition was therefore made in order to punish 
them on religious and political grounds. I63 The court ruled that such 
allegations demand a broader scope of inquiry into Northern Ire-
land's system of justice.I64 The court was particularly concerned with 
the "opaque procedures" employed by the Diplock Court system and 
the consequent difficulty of proving bias by looking only at the defen-
dants' courtroom experiences. I65 It stated, "The existence of bias is 
not always readily apparent from an individualized inquiry, particu-
larly where, as in Northern Ireland, procedural safeguards have been 
eliminated. Mter all, a trial judge or detective is unlikely to memorial-
156 See In re Requested Extradition of Artt, Brennan, Kirby, 158 F.3d 462, 472-75 (9th 
Cir. 1998), reh'g granted, 183 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 1999). 
157 See id. 
158 See id. at 473. 
159 See id. at 473-74. 
160 See id. In arriving at this conclusion, the court noted that James Smyth himself had 
not suffered any such discriminatory punishment since being extradited and returned to 
the Maze Prison. See In re Artt, Brennan, Kirby, 158 F.3d at 473. 
161 See id. at 474-76. 
162 Seeid. at 474. 
163 See id. 
164 See id. at 474-75. 
165 See In re Artt, Brennan, Kirby, 158 F.3d at 474-75. 
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ize the fact that his or her decisions were motivated by political or re-
ligious bias. "166 
While advocating a radical departure from the traditional rule of 
noninquiry, the court nonetheless was cautious about when broad ju-
dicial inquiries into systemic bias should take place.167 It fashioned a 
rule whereby "if a potential extraditee establishes prima facie that 
significant procedural abuses occurred before or during trial, he or 
she may present evidence of systemic bias within Northern Ireland's 
justice system during the relevant time period. "168 Accordingly, the 
cases of Artt and Kirby were remanded to the lower court with in-
structions that the defendants should be given the opportunity to 
make a prima facie showing of procedural abuse, and if successful, to 
present evidence of generalized political or religious bias in the 
Northern Ireland justice system.169 
The traditional rule of non inquiry has been a m~or obstacle to 
the pursuit of justice in extradition proceedings, and the Ninth Cir-
cuit's qualified decision to abandon that rule is a step in the right di-
rection. 170 As it is the function of the judiciary to certify or deny indi-
viduals for extradition,171 judges must be permitted to look at the "big 
picture" when considering a fugitive's Article 3(a) defenses.172 Under-
standably, some may fear that allowing judges broad powers of inquiry 
into a foreign justice system could weaken judicial resolve to extradite 
terrorists. This result is unlikely, because most judges will surely follow 
the admonition of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations which 
drafted Article 3(a): "It would be a perversion of the committee's in-
tent were [A]rticle 3(a) used to impede the extradition of those 
sought for acts of terrorism."173 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit did 
not universally broaden the role of judicial inquiry; it did so only for· 
instances where the defendant claims to have been wrongfully con-
victed.174 
In ratifying the Supplementary Treaty, the Senate both expressly 
and implicitly manifested its intent that the judiciary should playa 
166 Id. at 474. 
167 See id. at 475. 
168 Id. 
169 See id. at 475-76. 
170 See In re Artt,Brennan, Kirlry" 158 F.3d at 475. 
171 See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1994). 
172 SeeSlipplementary Treaty, supra note 2, art. 3(a). 
173 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 4. 
174 See In re Artt, Brennan, Kirlry, 158 F.3d at 475. 
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greater role in extradition proceedings.175 Noting the comments 
made by Senator Kerry,176 the Ninth Circuit justified its decision to 
broaden judicial inquiry, pointing out that "[t]he drafters [of Article 
3 (a)] clearly envisioned at least a limited inquiry at the systemic 
level."177 In addition, the Senate surely anticipated Article 3(a) chal-
lenges, and thus its ratification of the Supplementary Treaty implicitly 
condoned greater judicial inquiry than had previously occurred.178 
Furthermore, given the nature of the judiciary in the United 
States, judges are perhaps better able than legislators or diplomats to 
render a neutral analysis of foreign judicial systems.179 Members of the 
executive branch who set diplomatic policy are constrained by politi-
cal considerations that have no place in the courtroom.180 A federal 
judge sitting in an extradition proceeding, however, will hear evi-
dence of systemic bias in an orderly courtroom setting, largely re-
moved from the efforts of lobbyists or the influence of upcoming 
elections.181 Judges are therefore in an ideal position to analyze a fugi-
tive's claim that his or her conviction was based on prejudice rather 
than the fair application of law. 182 
That being said, the dissent in In re Artt, Brennan, Kirby elucidates 
a problem that needs to be addressed.183 The dissenting judge con-
tends that the majority's rule of law, in which evidence of systemic bias 
may be presented after a successful prima facie showing of procedural 
abuse, is too vague and will simply cause confusion,184 According to 
the dissenting judge, the majority'S opinion provides no guidance for 
what constitutes a prima facie showing of procedural abuse, since the 
defendant cannot use generalized evidence of bias in the Diplock sys-
tem to meet this threshold. 185 Though this is indeed a valid criticism, 
the concept of a prima facie threshold is nonetheless a good one, for 
otherwise every fugitive who contests extradition would stymie the 
175 See infra notes 176--78 and accompanying text. 
176 See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
177 In re Artt, Brennan, Kirby, 158 F.3d at 475 (emphasis added). 
178 See Supplementary Treaty, supra note 2, art. 3(a). 
179 See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1994) (relegating extradition proceedings to the judiciary). 
180 See id. 
181 See id. 
182 See ill. 
183 See infra notes 184-85 and accompanying text. 
184 See In re Artt, Brennan, Kirby, 158 F.3d at 476. (Goodwin,]., dissenting). 
185 See id. 
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court system with a prolonged investigation into the foreign legal sys-
tem.l86 
Rather than adopt a hard-and-fast prima facie evidentiary stan-
dard, courts should be afforded the discretion to determine for them-
selves if a fugitive's initial Article 3(a) claims warrant fuller investiga-
tion into the foreign judicial system.187 A judge might take into 
consideration the written record of the fugitive's conviction, the cir-
cumstances surrounding his or her incarceration and flight to the. 
United States, or simply the magnitude and nature of his or her alle-
gations. 188 Judges must be given broad leeway to act as a prudential 
gatekeeper, allowing or disallowing a fugitive's claims of trumped-up, 
prejudicial conviction.189 
The United States was founded as a refuge for those who were 
persecuted on religious or political grounds. Today, the United States 
has a moral duty to uphold these ideals when considering the fate of 
potential extraditees.19o Broad judicial inquiry under Article 3(a) is 
the best way to ensure that the United States does not extradite fugi-
tives who have been wrongfully convicted because of bias in a foreign 
legal system.191 
CONCLUSION 
Though the Supplementary Treaty helped clarify the circum-
stances under which a fugitive may assert a defense to extradition, it 
did not fully elucidate the proper scope of judicial inquiry into a for-
eign country's legal system. The courts have been left to determine 
for themselves the appropriate extent of inquiry when faced with a 
fugitive who asserts an Article 3(a) defense to extradition. This job is 
further complicated when considering fugitives from Northern Ire-
land, a region torn by violent political and religious quarrels. In that 
province, where the Diplock system exists in order to combat terrorist 
activity, the potential for bias against suspected terrorists is very high. 
In considering the fate of alleged terrorists Artt, Brennan, and Kirby, 
the Ninth Circuit correctly called for broad judicial inquiry when con-
sidering a fugitive's claim of prejudicial, trumped-up conviction. Once 
an individually-tailored prima facie threshold for asserting such a de-
186 See id. at 474. 
187 See Supplementary Treaty, supra note 2, art. 3(a). 
188 See id. 
189 See id.; In re Art!, Brennan, Kirby, 158 F.3d at 475. 
190 See Supplementary Treaty, supra note 2, art. 3(a). 
191 See id. 
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fense has been reached, the broad powers of inquiry called for in Artt, 
Brennan, Kirby should prevail as the rule of law in every circuit. 
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